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INTRODUCTION
W. E.B. DuBois once prophetically proclaimed in his monumental
work, The Souls of Black Folk, that "the problem of the Twentieth
Century is the problem of the color line."' What DuBois endeavored
* Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. W. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk xi (1903).
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to study was how the legal and social barriers placed around the lives
of Afro-Americans would be the single most important domestic issue
to be addressed by our democratic republic. As we approach the close
of the twentieth century, after celebrating our Constitution's Bicenten-
nial, DuBois' observation, unfortunately, maintains its vitality.2
This article proposes a reflection on that "problem" from the per-
spective of a law professor with an Afro-American heritage in the tra-
dition of Charles Hamilton Houston, a civil rights lawyer and former
dean and professor at the Howard University School of Law. Specifi-
cally, I wish to consider how we, as teachers of future lawyers and as
legal scholars, can best contribute to solving the problem of the color
line. I believe that Houston can continue to be a role model for all law
professors who are interested in social justice and the democratic ideal
embodied in the U.S. Constitution. This then is a study of the life and
career of Charles Hamilton Houston as an appropriate source for cre-
ating an agenda for scholar-activists who seek to address the problem
of the color line.
I. LAW PROFESSOR AS SCHOLAR
We minority law professors are a curious breed. At once, we are
part of the law academy, yet we are set apart by cultural, ethnic and
racial differences. As W.E.B. DuBois poignantly observed, there is a
veil that separates us from those around us.' Yet, while separate, we
are so much a part of the law institution-our very presence adds to
the richness of the academic body. Our different perspectives offer
unique, yet quintessentially American, insights on jurisprudence.4
2. To state the matter plainly, there is a continuing debate on what to do about "the prob-
lem of the color-line." Do racial discrimination and racism still exist and, if so, in what forms?
How should laws be structured to remedy racial inequality? Is affirmative action detrimental to
Blacks as well as whites, as suggested by the writings of Charles Murray, Thomas Sowell and
others? Has the color-line been etched deeper by the economic realities of class distinction as
suggested by Nicholas Lemann in his two-part article, "The Origins of the Underclass" in the
June and July 1986 issues of the Atlantic monthly? These questions are illustrative and are by no
means exhaustive of the issues involved in the debate.
3. DuBois, in describing his childhood, said that he recognized early on that he was differ-
ent from his white classmates in Barrington, Massachusetts. He exclaimed:
Then it dawned on me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or
like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil.
DuBois, supra note 1, at 44.
4. Again DuBois eloquently captures the point:
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this
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Our contributions and souls are necessary to the vitality and the struc-
tural integrity of what Derrick Bell, in assessing the legal academy,
described as a castle "located high on an impressive mountain."5
We are few in number. Our thin ranks suggest an institutional
intransigence to removing the veil and creating the diversity alluded to
by past American Association of Law Schools president, Susan West-
erberg Prager. It was she who challenged the legal academy "to ex-
plore how to increase the number of minority law teachers and how to
improve the quality of their professional experience." 6 I make this
observation, and others have made it more eloquently and thor-
oughly,7 to provide a glimpse of the background canvas upon which I
wish to paint. I also want to echo Dean Bell's claim that we are in-
deed "strangers in academic paradise." 8 Yet, if we are strangers, we
are strangers who enter paradise by right. Now is the tomorrow that
Langston Hughes predicted in the poem "I, Too Sing America,"
when, as he put it, "I'll be at the table when company comes. No-
body'll dare say to me, 'Eat in the kitchen,' then."9
Moreover, while we are strangers in academic paradise, we are
strangers with a most important mission. Dean Rennard Strickland
poignantly described the awesome tasks law professors face in balanc-
ing the demands of teaching, writing and servicing students and the
community as follows:
I believe, believe passionately, that serious scholarship is the duty,
the privilege, and the obligation of all who choose to live in the
academic community ... for those of us who have chosen to labor
in this vineyard, those who chose to become professors-to profess
American world,-a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets
him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation,
this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused con-
tempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dog-
ged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
Id. at 45.
5. D. Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise.- Law Teachers of Color in Still White Law
Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385 (1986).
6. Prager, President's Message, Minority Law Teachers, AALS Newsletter, Nov. 1986, at I-
3.
7. Laurence, Minority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Needfor Voluntary Quotas, 120
U.S.F. L. REV. 429 (1986).
8. Bell, supra note 5, at 385.
9. L. HUGHES, I, Too Sing America, in I AM THE DARKER BROTHER: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF MODERN POEMS BY NEGRO AMERICANS (A. Adoff ed. 1968).
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about the law-it is different. Balancing and balancing acts have
always been a part of the academy, from its earliest medieval begin-
nings. No matter how hard the task, scholarship is central to our
vocation. (Emphasis in the original.) 1"
If we are to engage in scholarship, we must view the task of scholar-
ship from our unique perspective. Indeed, we can ill afford not to
make our scholarship useful to our communities. As Professor Roy
Brooks so aptly noted, "each of us (and, indeed, all successful minori-
ties) has a special interest in doing what we can to aid less successful,
less fortunate minorities.""1
This special interest is at the heart of what former Dean J. Clay
Smith, Jr., has called "The Houstonian School of Jurisprudence."' 2
Charles Houston, as dean of the Howard University School of Law,
pioneered an approach for attacking the barriers of racial discrimina-
tion. 3 Houston believed that the black lawyer and the black legal
scholar ought to use the law as an instrument to achieve social justice
and full, equal civil rights for all Americans. He called for those
10. Strickland, Scholarship in the Academic Circus or the Balancing Act at the Minority Side
Show, 120 U.S.F. L. REv. 491-92 (1986).
11. Brooks, Civil Rights Scholarship: A Proposed Agenda for the Twenty-First-Century, 120
U.S.F. L. REV. 397, 398 (1986).
12. Smith, In Memoriam: Professor Frank D. Reeves Towards a Houstonian School of Juris-
prudence and the Study of Pure Legal Existence, 18 How. L.J. 1 (1973). This article is a memo-
rial celebration of the life and career of Frank D. Reeves, a Howard Law School graduate and
professor. Dean Smith provides a beautiful portrait of Professor Reeves and sets it in ihe rich
social justice legacy of Howard Law School and Charles Hamilton Houston.
In defining the Houstonian School of Jurisprudence, Smith describes it as "the analytical
process which Houston uniquely and indelibly left imprinted in American jurisprudence." Id. at
6-7 n.22. Smith further urges:
[I]t is incumbent upon the academic community to do what is compelled by history, the
deeds and the thinking of those lawyers and judges, who shared or who presently share
in common Houston's thoughts, and, that is, to be on with the task of fortifying the
Houstonian thought-process into a school of jurisprudence.
Id.
13. Howard University, in Washington D.C., was founded by an Act of Congress in 1867
and was named for General Oliver Otis Howard (1830-1909), the head of the post Civil War
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands (Freedmen's Bureau) and who influenced
Congress to appropriate funds for the school. Howard University was created to offer educa-
tional advantages without regard to race, creed, color or sex, but with a special obligation to
provide advanced studies for Blacks. Howard offers classes in the liberal and fine arts, law,
medicine, engineering, religion, human ecology and architecture. The School of Law had its first
class in 1869, graduating 10 students, including the first black woman lawyer, who became the
fourth woman to be admitted to the bar in the United States. The School of Law strives to
provide professional leadership for ongoing social changes in the country and in the world.
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trained in the law to be "social engineers."' 4 As presented in Dr.
Genna Rae McNeil's biography of Houston:
A social engineer was a highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive lawyer
who understood the Constitution of the United States and knew
how to explore its uses in the solving of 'problems of ... local com-
munities' and in 'bettering conditions of the underprivileged citi-
zens.' As he explained to his students, discrimination, injustice, and
the denial of full citizenship rights and opportunities on the basis of
race and a background of slavery, could be challenged within the
context of the Constitution if it were creatively, innovatively inter-
preted and used. 15
If the goals of the Houstonian School of Jurisprudence are to ac-
tualize the civil rights of all Americans, solve local problems, and im-
prove the quality of life, then how are these goals to be achieved by
those who practice or profess the law? A review of the monumental
works on Dean Houston by Judge William H. Hastie, Judge Spott-
swood W. Robinson III, Dean Smith and Dr. McNeil, provides an
excellent blueprint for building a scholarly career purposefully di-
rected toward social and economic justice.' 6 Using their work as a
fertile source, I will examine Houston's personality, the activist meth-
odologies he used to pursue social engineering goals, and the substan-
tive philosophy and principles that undergird the Houstonian School
of Jurisprudence. I will then consider how the model of Houston as
scholar-activist can be applied to today's problems of the color line.
II. THE PERSONALITY OF CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON
To comprehend fully the Houstonian School of Jurisprudence,
14. G. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 84 (1983) [hereinafter MCNEIL].
15. Id. at 84-85.
16. The following works were used as primary source material for this article: Robinson,
No Tea for the Feeble: Two Perspectives on Charles Hamilton Houston, 20 How. L.J. 1 (1977).
This article is the printed version of an address given by Judge Spottswood W. Robinson on
April 30, 1976 to the Washington Bar Association. Judge Robinson was chosen as a substitute
speaker due to the untimely death of Judge William H. Hastie. Judge Robinson utilized a por-
tion of a manuscript Judge Hastie had originally prepared for the address.
Smith, supra note 12, and Smith, Toward Pure Legal Existence: Blacks and the Constitution,
30 How. L.J. 629 (1987). These two works explore the jurisprudence of Charles Hamilton
Houston and develop Dean J. Clay Smith's theory of pure legal existence.
G. McNEIL, supra note 14. This is a comprehensive biography of Charles Hamilton
Houston.
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one must appreciate the "complex bundle of those inner qualities"' 7
that formed the marrow of Houston's personhood. Certainly, his fam-
ily background and excellent educational preparation readied him for
his life's work.' 8 However, personal experience and observation of the
17. Robinson, supra note 16, at 7.
18. Houston was born on September 3, 1895 in Washington, D.C., the son of William LePre
Houston, who had completed his law studies and had been admitted to the bar of the District of
Columbia in 1892, and Mary Ethel Hamilton Houston who was trained as a hairdresser. Charles
received his primary and secondary education in the segregated Washington school system.
Charles' parents were hardworking and sought to move whenever possible to better
neighborhoods until they and their boy were situated comfortably in the narrow and
secure environment of Washington's black middle class. From the example of a father
who worked ceaselessly to place his family beyond the reach of severe economic pro-
scriptions and assume a notable position in the professional class, Charles learned much
about the industry and persistence of strong black men. From his mother's example,
Charles learned much about the dignity of being identified as a negro.... She never
hesitated to inform [her] patrons that she expected to be called 'Mrs. Houston', not
'Mary', [and] that she be admitted through their front doors, and to work without
having to listen to disparaging remarks about the Negro race. From his father's and
mother's frequent and fond references to a mainspring, a parental source of strength,
Charles learned that there was a cause for great pride in his own heritage.
G. McNEIL, supra note 14, at 27.
Charles attended M Street high school, "the classical high school for black children
throughout the district." Id. at 28. M Street had as its purpose to prepare boys and girls for
college. The curriculum was based on college entrance requirements and the faculty was com-
posed of exceptionally well trained teachers. Though Charles was not a brilliant student, he did
well in many subjects. "His English performances, for example, fluctuated from excellent to
good to fair to good, while he excelled in such subjects as algebra and Greek.... On I I June,
1911, at the age of fifteen, Charles was graduated from M Street High School." Id. at 30.
Charles was accepted at Amherst and attended there from September, 1911 to June, 1915.
A year as the only student of African descent at Amherst had taught Charles lessons
not assigned by any professor ... [and] [a]lthough his race set him apart in some ways.
Charles was known to his teachers because of his good work, not merely his race...
the alienation born of racism continued to be a Catalyst for Charles' academic and
personal self-reliance. On his own at Amherst College, he refused to harbor any
debilitating feelings of inferiority. 'Let us..., since we believe that we are as divine as
possible in this generation, resolve ... to depend upon ourselves exclusively as much as
possible, in all walks of life,' he declared to his father. Occasionally there were profes-
sors who simply could not believe that a black student could be worthy of a better-than-
average grade, but the Houston standard was always excellence.
Id. at 32.
In his senior year, because of his excellent grades and good moral character, he was elected
to Phi Beta Kappa and chosen as one of the revered "Bond Fifteen" scholars. Charles was
graduated magna cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree. As a result of the influence of his
father, Charles was given the position of Supply Instructor in English for the 1915-16 academic
year at Howard University where he taught not only the required English courses, but also devel-
oped a specialized course in "Negro Literature." Id. at 33-36.
In 1919 Houston began his study of law at Harvard where he was elected to the editorial
board of the Harvard Law Review, the second of his race to be so honored. Id. at 49-51. He was
awarded the Sheldon Travelling Fellowship and studied in Spain at the University of Madrid for
nine months in 1923-24. Id. at 53-54. He was admitted to the District of Columbia bar in 1924
and went into practice with his father. Id.
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fires of racial injustice forged the steel of his motivation.' 9 The bitter
gall of segregation often drained him emotionally and physically.
20
For Houston, there was no other conclusion but that, "Racism must
go!"
2 1
Houston realized that "the fight for human freedom [was] inter-
minable."'22 The struggle required great personal and professional sac-
rifice.23 Moments with his family were rare. On his death bed,
Houston wrote the following message to his then five-year-old son,
Charles, Jr., in the Joshua Liebman book, PEACE OF MIND:
Tell Bo I did not run out on him but went down fighting that he
might have better and broader opportunities than I had without
19. Houston and others had to fight to win the right to be commissioned as officers in the
Army during World War I. See G. McNEIL, supra note 14, at 36-40. In fighting for his country
and the cause of democracy and freedom in a yet segregated U.S. Army, Houston contended
with the racism of his compatriots. Judge Robinson observed:
In France he suffered all of the insults, humiliations and crass injustices that his White
American comrades in arms, 'both commanders and those in the ranks, heaped upon
Black wearers of our country's uniform. It secured him to be treated as despised infer-
ior, a lesser breed, by whites to whom he was vastly superior by any measure. His
comfortable and rather protected upbringing made the shock of this experience greater
in his case than for most black soldiers. In any event, the hurt and the bitterness of the
young army officer would never be far from the consciousness of the eminent civil
rights lawyer. Whatever his intellectual contribution to the law might have been, his
enduring passion for racial justice and equality could not have been the same without
this searing wartime experience.
Robinson, supra note 16, at 3.
20. Houston found the widespread segregation of public accommodations particularly gall-
ing. Benjamin Amos was a young lawyer with Houston's firm who recalled lunch on a particular
day:
At the time they had the Executive ... at the corner of Fifth and F, and we had to go in
by the fountain and watch clerks [of various] judges, and other whites belong[ing] to
the court go in there, sit down, and eat. We'd have to stand there and take it out. This
... day, Charlie, I, and a third person.., got the lunch. We went up to the office, and
he got inside and he couldn't stand it .... He stood in front of Gloria Young [who was
at the switchboard] .... She was there with Lucretia Jackson [one of the secretaries]
and said, 'I just can't take it any longer,' and threw stuff on the floor in the center of the
office ... and burst into tears. [In that] very emotional moment for him he said, one
day, we'll see these streets open and Negroes ... go anywhere and eat.
G. McNEIL, supra note 14, at 185 (quoting an interview with Benjamin Davis).
One day, Houston's wife, Henrietta, left his son, Charlie Jr., with Houston while she kept an
appointment. Joseph Waddy, Charlie Jr.'s godfather and a partner in Houston's firm recalled:
Charlie had to go to the drugstore for something and he took the boy along. While
Charlie was being taken care of, the boy climbed up on a stool by the soda fountain and
the man behind the fountain said to him "Get down from there, you little nigger-you
got no business here." When they got back to the office, we had to take Charlie into the
backroom and give him a sedative.
Id. at 186-87 (quoting an interview with Joseph Waddy).
21. Id. at 183.
22. Id. at 185.
23. Houston sacrificed a lucrative private practice for the cause of justice. Id. at 59.
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prejudice or bias operating against him, and in any fight some fall.
2 4
The wretched experience of injustice provoked in Houston "a
fierce determination-to succeed in all that he undertook to accom-
plish."'25 Houston's strength of will and depth of character drove him
doggedly to pursue cases in the face of monumental obstacles. Even
when hospitalized with a life-threatening heart attack, "Charles
[would] disobey his doctor's orders and his father's wishes by having
people from the office bring work in for him to do and receiving visi-
tors with business concerns.
26
Finally, Houston was a "perfectionist; . . . [who did not] allow
any margin for mediocrity., 27  "Careful analysis, thorough research
and intensive preparation" were Houston hallmarks in any lawyering
experience.2" While others may worry about meeting minimum levels
of competency,29 for Charles Houston, the call to the practice of law
"was a call for the superlative."3
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF HOUSTON
Houston set about the task of making the Constitution a viable
document for all Americans. To accomplish this monumental feat he
utilized the following methods: (1) he developed a cadre of lawyers
trained in the art of social engineering; (2) he designed strategies com-
24. Id. at 212.
25. Robinson, supra note 16, at 6.
26. G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 209 (See discussion of the meeting with Gardner Bishop
of the Consolidated Parent Group, Inc., an organization formed to attack segregation in the
public school system of Washington, D.C.).
27. Robinson, supra note 16, at 6. Houston was adamant in his demand that his Howard
students strive for perfection in their practice of law and in their pursuit of social justice.
He had given his students a slogan: in the legal arena there would be 'no tea for the
feeble, and no crepe for the dead.' And as earlier he had written to the law school
prospect, he realized that he himself had not only [to] be good but superior, [and] just
as superior in all respects as time, energy, money and ability permit[ted] and that he
could 'not tolerate any ceiling on his ambitions or imagination.'
Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. American Bar Association, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK
FORCE ON PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE (1983).
30. Robinson, supra note 16, at 6.
A prodigious worker, he dedicated himself fully to the task, shutting out all else around
him and directing all of his unbounded energy to it. Long hours, incessant toil and
meticulous attention to each element of the problem were the keys. Through them, the
result invariably was a self-satisfying product, and a sterling performance in a case.
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mensurate with the task; and (3) he sought to mobilize the masses in
support of this "interminable struggle." I will briefly discuss each of
these methods.
A. Developing A Cadre
As noted by Judge Robinson (quoting Judge Hastie), when
Charles Houston was appointed vice-dean of the Howard Law School,
then Howard President Mordecai Johnson expressed his hopes for the
Law School:
a vision of superior professional training and extraordinary motiva-
tion calculated to prepare the professional cadres needed to lead
successful litigation against racism as practiced by government and
sanctioned by law.3 '
With the fierce determination that was his stock-in-trade, Hous-
ton led the transformation of Howard Law School from a part-time
evening program to a fully-accredited, day program of the first rank.32
Houston succeeded in crafting a legal education program that pro-
duced the best trained black lawyers in the nation.33 Distinguished
lawyers such as Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robinson, Oliver
Hill, and Pauli Murray graduated from the Howard University School
of Law and went on to lead the fight for social justice.34
Houston also cultivated relationships with practicing lawyers
around the nation. As Special Counsel for the N.A.A.C.P., he worked
with counsel from around the country developing test cases.35 Later,
as a private practitioner who was "free to hit and fight wherever the
31. Id. at 3-4 (quoting William H. Hastie).
32. See G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 69-75.
33. Charles Houston proposed that the 'immediate objective' of the school should be
'to make itself a more efficient training school' in order to fulfill the race's need for'capable and socially alert Negro lawyers.' As a training school, Howard Law School
should seek to 'equip its students with the direct and professional skills most useful to
them' and, stressed Houston, to 'give them as deep and as broad a societal background
as possible.' ... Forced out into private practice directly from school, because racism
usually eliminated most clerkship opportunities, black law students needed training
with particular attention to the 'legal aspects of Negro economic, social and political
life.'
Id. at 71 (quoting Houston).
34. See generally Comment, Justiciable Cause: Howard University Law School and the
Struggle for Civil Rights, 22 How. L.J. 283 (1979); P. MURRAY, SONG IN A WEARY THROAT
220-31 (1987).
35. G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 140.
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circumstances call[ed] for action,"3 6 Houston worked with numerous
lawyers, including Thurgood Marshall and Spottswood Robinson, on
many of the landmark civil rights cases. 37 These working relation-
ships were always an educational experience for those lawyers fortu-
nate enough to participate in a litigation endeavor with Houston. As
Judge Robinson has observed:
The truth is that Charlie was a law teacher all of his days. To
join him in some legal undertaking was a valuable educational expe-
rience. Surrounded by an aura of extreme competence, his very
presence in legal dialogue commanded respect. His wise advice, ac-
companied by explanation of the analysis and synthesis forerunning
it, was a revelation in itself. Just to watch him in action was to
witness a demonstration of the way it ought to be done.
38
B. Designing Strategies
To bring his broad-ranging vision of social justice to full reality,
Houston needed a carefully designed plan of action. In fact, he faced
every task, big or small, with a preconceived, thorough plan designed
to accomplish a given end. Again, Judge Robinson described the pro-
cess most succinctly: "To his extraordinary mind and talent he added
imaginative approaches, thoughtfully conceived plans of action and
decisive modes of execution."
39
An important part of Houston's jurisprudence was to apply "im-
aginative approaches" to basic constitutional principles in the struggle
for social justice. For example, in the struggle for equality in educa-
tional opportunity, Houston confronted the "separate but equal" doc-
trine of Plessy v. Ferguson," the rule of law in the states that honored
Jim Crow. Some, like Nathan Margold, Houston's predecessor as
Special Counsel to the N.A.A.C.P., sought a frontal assault on the
bastion of segregation.4 ' Houston, however, recognized the limits of
this approach given the tenor of the time and the pervasiveness of ra-
36. Id. at 149 (quoting Houston).
37. See discussion infra note 14 and accompanying text.
38. Robinson, supra note 16, at 7.
39. Id. at 5-6.
40. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 135.
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cial discrimination.42 He reckoned that one should take the law as it
stood and push the doctrine of separate but equal to its logical limits.
Houston knew that separate was never intended to be equal, and that
under its strict application, the doctrine would fall of its own weight,
as it did in Brown v. Board of Education.43
Houston held the view that "the program of litigation [should] be
conducted as a protracted legal struggle to secure favorable legal
precedents, and thereby lay a foundation for subsequent frontal at-
tacks against racial discrimination and segregation."" He proceeded
by "devising 'positionary tactics' or 'the steps [one] takes to move
from one position to another'-and clearly articulating the rationale
for these tactics."45 In the arena of segregated educational systems,
this strategy called for challenging the differentials in salaries between
white and black teachers in the same system, the "inequalities of trans-
portation facilities" provided to black and white school children, and
the "inequalities in graduate and professional education usually of-
fered white students in universities supported by state funds."46
To effect this imaginative approach, Houston also crafted
"thoughtfully conceived plans of action." These plans formed the
map for the march towards equality in education. 7 The road Hous-
ton took was much broader than the narrow path usually travelled by
litigating lawyers. The masses of black people had to see the plan as a
viable one. Furthermore, the people had to adopt the plan fervently
and participate intimately in the struggle.48
42. Houston realized that the law and those who interpreted the law were often bound by
precedent and therefore slow to change. He observed:
We must never forget that the public officers, elective or appointive, are servants of the
class which places them in office and maintains them there. It is too much to expect the
courts to go against the established and crystallized social customs, when to do so
would mean professional and political suicide.... We cannot depend upon the judges
to fight our battles.
Id. at 135 (quoting Houston).
43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. Id. at 134.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 136; See also KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976). See generally Brown,
supra note 43, at 135-54.
47. See generally G. McNEIL, supra note 14, at 141-42 for Houston's eight-step procedure
for attacking discrimination in county school systems.
48. Id.
Houston indicated steps black citizens could take to secure better schools. He empha-
sized that 'the first item on any program for improvement of public schools for Negroes
1989)
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Finally, Houston insisted on "decisive modes of execution."49 He
was highly selective about the test cases he chose.50 The fact situation
and the procedural background had to be strong enough to avoid a
dismissal on mere technicalities.5" On the other hand, losing a dis-
crimination suit could have ancillary benefits such as having laws
placed on the books to provide school transportation for black stu-
dents or out-of-state scholarships for graduate or professional educa-
tion.52 Merely filing a suit was sometimes a method for obtaining
access to vital information such as a state's dual salary guide for
teachers. 
53
C. Mobilizing the Masses
An integral part of carrying out this strategy of positionary tac-
tics was to bring the social justice message to the forefront of the pub-
must be convincing.the mass of Negroes themselves that they are a part of the public
which owns, and controls the schools.' Although there were some public schools ad-
ministered and attended exclusively by whites, 'both schools belong to one and the
same system, and the system belongs to the public.
Id. at 141.
49. Houston's program for the legal struggle against educational discrimination was as
follows:
He selected 'three glaring and typical discriminations as focal points for legal action'
... ; [(I)] differentials in teachers' pay between white and Negro teachers having the
same qualifications, holding the same certificate, and doing the same work; [(2)] ine-
qualities in transportation facilities which lie at the basis of all problems of consolidated
rural schools; [(3)] inequalities in graduate and professional education usually offered
white students in universities supported by state funds, while Negro education is cut off
with the undergraduate work in college.
G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 136 (quoting Houston).
50. Id.
51. The first graduate school case brought by Houston and the NAACP, that of Donald
Gaines Murray against the University of Maryland Law School in 1935, fulfilled the requisite
qualifications of a solid test case:
The situation represented a 'sharply defined issue' which could be 'supported by de-
monstrable evidence.' It presented 'key discriminations' while it both provided an op-
portunity for enforcement though 'auxiliary legal proceedings' and 'furnished a focus or
springboard for extending attacks on a larger front. . . .' Houston believed it, 'a chance
to develop under oath by examination of witnesses and ... documents, the discrimina-
tions from which Maryland Negroes suffer.'
Id. at 138 (quoting Houston).
52. Id. at 136.
53. Id. McNeil emphasized this point with a quote from Houston:
We have very little money, very few trained investigators. But all we need is about
$10.00, then we can file a case in court. Five dollars more, and we can bring the whole
state education department into court with all its records, put each official on the stand
under oath and wring him dry of information.
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lic forum.54 Not only did the law need to be reformed, but the entire
social milieu had to be transformed to make equal justice under the
law a reality. 5  Accordingly, locil organizations across the nation
were encouraged to fight against systemic educational inequities.56
McNeil makes the following cogent observation about Houston's phil-
osophical and strategic approach when she recounts a discussion
Houston had with Howard Thurman, then dean of Howard Univer-
sity's chapel:
No teacher's salary case would be won without significant mass sup-
port, and mass support could be generated only if he [Houston] and
the NAACP cared about mass education. How could one use a
hostile or indifferent press to educate the masses to a sympathetic
understanding of the constitutional rights of Negroes? [Houston]
answered his own question: Make the civil rights struggle news by
proceeding with meeting after meeting and case after case that the
media would have to cover because it involved elected or appointed
officials. Maximum exposure would work on the public and create
a new sensitivity, a new apperceptive mass. Effective legal strategy
was more than courtroom technique and knowing the law.57
Finally, there were some times when direct action was necessary.
Public officials had to be confronted directly. Black parents had to
boycott the schools. Sacrificial action was required if it would grab the
public's attention and focus it on the horrors of segregation.
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE JURISPRUDENTIAL GROUNDING
OF HOUSTON
To know what Houston doggedly fought for is to understand the
jurisprudential undergirdings of his efforts. He stood on sound, funda-
54. Houston routinely made public speeches and wrote articles for THE CRisIs, the
NAACP's official magazine. He correctly sensed the necessity of raising the consciousness of all
Americans.
Houston's suggestion regarding a remedy for this problem was that black people, their
friends, and civil libertarians seek opportunities to state their case to the white public
since the old channels of publicity were inadequate and the radio was not customarily
open for discussions of speeches promoting the concept of racial equality. Houston also
encouraged blacks to 'cooperate in public forums,... agitate for more truth about the
Negro [in education institutions and] ... [a]long with this educational process ... be
prepared to fight, if necessary, every step of the way.'
Id. at 139 (quoting Houston).
55. Id. at 152.




mental constitutional principles-most significantly the fourteenth
amendment-at the center of which is the essence of American
democracy:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
58
In essence Houston saw the rights of citizenship and the privilege
of full enjoyment of those rights as belonging to all citizens. Any
dimunition of those rights or the prevention of the enjoyment of them
did violence to the Constitution and worked a grave injustice to the
individual citizen. The principle has been described by Dean J. Clay
Smith as the "pure legal existence." 9 In discussing the fact that Afri-
can-Americans have endured disparate and discriminatory treatment
under law and custom, and how such treatment negated citizenship
rights, Smith articulated the principle of pure legal existence as
follows:
Today, by-and-large, the lack of recognition of the metaphysi-
cal worth of black people stems from the mistaken belief that black
people are less than human .... To the extent that the uneven and
disparate application of the law has left any notion of the lack of the
worth and human dignity of black people, or has interfered in any
way with their natural right to freely participate in a republic born
on a philosophical base that all men are created equal under law-
to that extent, black people have been denied a pure legal existence.
Pure legal existence looks to the future but studies the past of the
law that touches black people and those similarly situated, in order
to trace, to ascertain, and to analytically assess the growth of how
near they are to an existence which is free from racial discrimina-
tion. Pure legal existence, then, is an existence, under law, which is
barren of racial discrimination in law and in its application; it en-




58. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. Smith, supra note 12, at 4-5.
60. Id. at 5. Professor Smith further argues that the decision not to grant pure legal exist-
ence dates back to the Framers of the Constitution. Smith, Towards a Pure Legal Existence,
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Smith, like Houston, premised his definition on the realization
that anyone, regardless of race, color or creed, who meets the criteria
of United States citizenship, must be treated equally under the law.6
Each individual has the same bundle of rights and each individual may
not be denied those rights without the due process of law.
Moreover, our fundamental national charter is premised on a
doctrine of inclusion. Each individual is an inseparable part of the
body politic. Each individual is a fellow countryman or countrywo-
man to the next individual. When the Constitution proclaims "We the
People," it announces that this is a nation of people with a rich, com-
mon heritage and shared values. Although our direct ancestors came
over on different boats, as it has often been said, we are all in the same
boat now.6 2 More than anything else, Houston fought for the full in-
supra note 16, at 631-33. Smith categorizes this as a "moral flaw." Id. at 631. Similarly, Ralph
Ellison, in considering Thomas Jefferson's hypocrisy in writing the Declaration of Indepen-
dence's indictment of King George III's support of the slave trade, recognized the moral failings
of the Framers:
Thus the new edenic political scene incorporated a flaw similar to the crack that ap-
peared in the Liberty Bell and embodied a serpent-like malignancy that would tempt
government an individual alike to a constantly recurring fall from democratic inno-
cence .... Portentously, the founding fathers' refusal to cleanse themselves was moti-
vated by hierarchical status and economic interests. It was rationalized by the code of
social'manners that went with their inherited form and manner of speech, their linguis-
tic style. Revolutionary fervor notwithstanding, they were gentlemen, and Jefferson's
indictment provided these men the convenient excuse for not violating their private
interests and their standards of good taste. Thus the glaring transparencies of Jeffer-
son's rhetoric afforded them a purely formal escape from the immediate dilemma posed
by the conflict between freedom and slavery, and allowed them to use social tact as a
tactic of moral evasion.
Ellison, Perspective on Literature, 18 CARLETON MISCELLANY 69, 76-77 (1980).
61. McNeil emphasizes the point in presenting a speech given by Houston to the YWCA
annual convention on May 5, 1934. She quotes:
I ask you to take the question out of the realm of abstractions and to restate it in terms
of human relationships .... [U]nderstand that it is a question of reconciling the wants
and desires of different human beings, each equally entitled to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness .... We are not, asking you to take up the cross out of only
sentimental interest in the Negro. . . . We do expect you to throw all you energies
twenty-four hours a day in a fight for elemental justice without regard to race, class or
creed.
G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 100.
62. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to overcome in the struggle to become part of American
society is the fear white Americans have of black Americans. In explaining this fear of blacks,
especially by the Framers of the Constitution, Dean Smith argues:
Black people were not considered originally free. If slaves were to revert to their free
status, a belief always held by Blacks, this would have vested them with the same rights
and privileges as whites. The thought of such reversionary rights created a fear of
Blacks. Some believed that Blacks posed dangers to the State and such discourse was
used to prolong the institution of slavery.
Smith, supra note 12, at 634.
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clusion of African-Americans into the fabric of the American commu-
nity.63 He wanted all Black children, especially his own son, to
partake fully of the same menu of opportunities regularly provided to
white children.' For Houston, struggle was to become part of the
American action, to have a proportionate piece of the American pie
and not have to settle for mere morsels. Houston believed that it was
imperative that "no Negro tolerate any ceiling on his ambitions or
imagination."65
The principle of pure legal existence and the doctrine of inclusion
were clearly evident in the three major fields upon which Houston
fought his battles: housing, education, and employment.
A. The Right to Secure Housing
The ability to choose freely an abode is the ability to take care of
body and soul-to provide shelter and warmth for one's family and to
choose freely the best home available within one's means. On a more
subtle level, what is at issue is the opportunity to live in a place with
clean water and sanitary conditions and with access to medical serv-
ices, food and shopping facilities. These are all part and parcel of "the
pursuit of life, liberty and happiness."66
Houston's major housing fight was against restrictive covenants,
67
agreements between contiguous land owners not to sell their property
63. Professor Smith, in commenting on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
reminds us that the struggle to make America live up to its jurisprudential principles continues:
Black Americans join the nation in celebrating the bicentennial of our instrument of
rule. However, this year will cause black Americans to speak the truth about the ag-
ony, the violence, the human disregard, the ignorance, and the economic and human
despair resulting from the exclusions of Blacks from the definition and the panoply of
causal effects can be easily documented.
While many Americans will dwell on the writings and political activities of Jefferson,
madison, Jay, and leading contemporary constitutional law scholars, many Black
Americans will use this bicentennial year to honor the unsung national heroes and
heroines, the men and women of color who were deprived of their liberty by the phan-
tom whims of segregated systems whose doors closed to other than white faces.
Id. at 630.
64. G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 168.
65. Robinson, supra note 16, at 5 (quoting Houston).
66. Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
67. As part of his private practice, Houston whittled away at Corrigan v. Buckley, the
1926 Supreme Court decision declaring racially restrictive covenants enforceable by the
courts, prosecuting after 1940 such District cases as Arthur Bishop et al. v. Mabel
Chamberlain et al., Sallie Broadway et al v. Arthur Bishop et al., Arthur Bishop et al. v.
Raphael G. Uriolo et al. in the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals.
G. NcNEIL, supra note 14, at 177.
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to anyone of a different race, color, creed or religion.6 8 Here, Houston
scored major victories in the United States Supreme Court. In Shelley
v. Kraemer6 9 and Hurd v. Hodge,7" the Court was called on to decide
if a private restrictive covenant, which prohibited a black citizen from
purchasing property from a white citizen, violated the Constitution,
and if the courts could be called upon to enforce these covenants.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court recognized first the value of the
rights at stake:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be pro-
tected from discriminatory state action by the [fjourteenth
[a]mendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of
property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was re-
garded by the framers of that [a]mendment as an essential pre-con-
dition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties
which the [a]mendment was intended to guarantee.7 1
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court found that the state was not
merely passively facilitating a private action, but was engaging in cog-
nizable state action.72 Such action could not be conducted by the state
courts in contradiction of the rights guaranteed by the federal Consti-
tution. Similarly, in Hurd v. Hodge, federal courts could not be called
upon to enforce racially restrictive covenants.7 3 Chief Justice Vinson,
68. In his dissent in Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1029-1030, fn. 1, (1972), Justice
Douglas lays out the history of restrictive covenants:
Historically, racial zoning ordinances imposed by local law were a formidable factor in
creating and maintaining racially exclusive neighborhoods. Although such ordinances
were held unconstitutional. As early as 1917, some communities continued to enforce
them, even as late as the 1950's.
Judicial enforcement by the State Courts of racially restrictive covenants has been an-
other important factor. Although these covenants were private agreements to excluded
members of designated minority groups, the fact that they were enforceable by the
courts gave them maximum effectiveness. No until 1948 was the judicial enforcement
of such covenants held unconstitutional, and not until 1953 was their enforcement by
way of money damages held unlawful. Racially restrictive covenants no longer are
judicially enforceable, but they still appear in deeds and the residential patterns they
helped to create still persist. Various exercises of local government authority, such as
decisions on building permits, the location of sewer and water facilities, building inspec-
tion standards, zoning and land use requirements, and the power of eminent domain
have been used to exclude minority group of members from designated neighborhoods
and even from entire communities . . . [T]he categorical distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation is not as clear-cut as it would appear.
Id.
69. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
70. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1947).
71. Shelly, 334 U.S. at 10.
72. Id. at 19.
73. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 34-35. Chief Justice Vinson wrote:
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writing for the Court, succinctly stated the holding:
The task of determining whether the action of a State offends consti-
tutional provisions is one which may not be undertaken lightly.
Where, however, it is clear that the action of the State violates the
terms of the fundamental charter, it is the obligation of this Court
so to declare ....
Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the mat-
ter of primary concern was the establishment of equality in the en-
joyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of
those rights from discriminatory action on the part of the States
based on considerations of race or color.7 4
Chief Justice Vinson's holding is but a restatement of Smith's
principle of pure legal existence. Shelley and Hurd therefore recognize
the existence of basic constitutionally protected civil and political
rights. Further, these cases uphold the proposition that as each indi-
vidual seeks to procure the necessities for human survival, he does so
with open access to the full range of the American community. Thus,
a citizen's basic rights are protected, and he is included in the fabric of
society.
B. The Right to Secure Education
Houston's struggles in the area of education reflect the twin
themes of pure legal existence and inclusion in society's fundamental
institution. While some specifics of the education struggle were dis-
cussed above, this section will focus on the importance of combatting
racial discrimination in education.
Historically, states did not provide comprehensive education for
their citizens. Once free, however, public compulsory education be-
came a fundamental government service that states were obliged to
provide to all citizens.7 5 In discharging this obligation, states must
The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all
times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the
United States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applicable
legal precedents. Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of
that policy it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial
powers.
Id. at 34-35.
74. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23.
75. For a general study of the development of public education prior to the [four-
teenth] [a]mendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American Cul-
ture (1953), Pts. 1, 11; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc.
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provide each child, regardless of race, with an educational bundle of
equal quality. This was the major premise of Houston's strategy in
education.
In confronting the issue of segregated education, Houston pro-
ceeded by asserting the individual right of each student to an educa-
tion of a quality equal to the education received by each other student.
His fight for equal opportunity in graduate education serves as an ex-
cellent example of his strategies and tactics.
Houston first challenged the laws of Maryland, which enforced
segregated education at the University of Maryland School of Law, in
the case of Pearson v. Murray.76 At issue was whether the state could
provide scholarships for black graduate students to study law only at
out-of-state schools without violating the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.77 Donald Murray, except for his race, was
II-XII. School practices current at the time of the adoption of the [flourteenth
[a]mendment are described in Butts an Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra at
288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also
H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public
schools followed substantially the same pattern in both the North and the South, the
development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some
twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower develop-
ment in the South e.g., the rural character of the South and the different regional atti-
tudes toward state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In
the country as a whole, but particulary in the South, the War virtually stopped all
progress in public education. Id., at 427-428. The low status of Negro education in all
sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War, described in Beale,
A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195.
Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until after ratification
of the [flourteenth [a]mendment, and it .was not until 1918 that such laws were in force
in all the states. Cubberley, supra at 563-565.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 n.4 (1954).
The Supreme Court noted in Brown:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 n.4.
76. Pearson v. Murry, 169 Ms. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936). See also G. MCNEIL, supra note 14,
at 138-139.
77. Pearson, 169 Md. at 478, 182 A. at 590. The Maryland Court of Appeals gave a clear
statement of the matter:
Separation of the races must nevertheless furnish equal treatment. The constitutional
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otherwise qualified to be accepted at the University of Maryland.7"
The Maryland Court of Appeals noted the inadequacy of a remedy
that provided for an out-of-state scholarship:
Going to any law school in the nearest jurisdiction would,
then, involve him in considerable expense even with the aid of one
of the scholarships should he chance to receive one. And as the
petitioner points out, he could not there have the advantages of
study of the law of this state primarily, and of attendance on state
courts, where he intends to practice.79
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that Murray had to be ad-
mitted to the University of Maryland Law School.8" Although the
court did not overturn the segregated educational system, it recog-
nized that equality of educational opportunities had to be provided by
the State of Maryland.8'
The next "positionary tactic" Houston utilized was to challenge a
state system which had the ability to offer in-state educational facilities
in segregated schools for students of color.82 This was accomplished
in Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada.3 Lloyd Gaines had sought ad-
mission to the University of Missouri School of Law.84 Missouri pro-
vided out-of-state scholarships and had the ability to create a law
program at Lincoln University (the school reserved for Missouri stu-
dents of color). The real controversy focused on the subjective quality
of the educational bundle each student received.85 Houston stated the
matter plainly:
requirement cannot be dispensed with in order to maintain a school or schools for
whites exclusively. That requirement comes first. **** And as no separate law school
is provided by this state for colored students, the main question in the case is whether
the separation can be maintained, and negroes excluded from the present school, by
reason of equality of treatment furnished the latter in scholarships for studying outside
the state were law schools are open to negroes.
Id. at 485, 182 A. at 593.
78. Id. at 478, 182 A. at 590.
79. Id. at 486, 182 A. at 593.
80. Id. at 489, 182 A. at 594.
81. No separate school for colored students has been decided "upon and only an inadequate
substitute has been provided. Compliance with the Constitution cannot be deferred at the will of
the state. Whatever system it adopts for legal education now must furnish equality of treatment
now." Id.
82. See generally Houston, A Challenge to Negro College Youth, 45 CRISIS 14-15 (Jan.
1938); G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 143-44, 149-51.
83. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
84. Id. at 342.
85. See id. at 346-48.
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But what do the white students get for their money? First and fore-
most, they preserve the rights and dignity of their citizenship. Sec-
ond, they get the benefit of all the tax moneys which the state of
Missouri year after year pours into the University of Missouri.
Third, they have the advantage of any specialization which the Uni-
versity of Missouri gives to Missouri problems, and the advantage
of associating with the future leaders of Missouri. In exchange for
this the state banishes its Negro students with [a] hundred dollars or
so for each as tuition in an out-of-state university where they enroll
not by right, but by tolerance as strangers and outsiders.8 6
The Missouri Court of Appeals, unconvinced by such rational
constitutional analysis, upheld the trial court's denial of a writ of man-
damus compelling the University of Missouri to admit Gaines.87 The
United States Supreme Court found that Gaines had not been treated
equally on a privilege given to white law students in Missouri. The
Court found that Gaines' constitutional right to equal protection
under the law had been violated.8 8 Gaines was admitted to the law
school at the University of Missouri.
Gaines and Murray laid the groundwork for two subsequent deci-
sions: Sweatt v. Painter89 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.90
In those cases, decided on the same day, the United States Supreme
Court considered the subjective quality of educational opportunities.
In Sweatt, the Court noted that even though the State of Texas had
recently created a law school for black students, the newly created
school did not compare to the vastly superior facilities, faculty and
86. Houston, supra note 81, at 14.
87. Gaines, supra note 82, at 339.
88. The court held:
The admissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment of privileges afforded by
the State rest wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the
separated groups within the State. The question here is not of duty of the State to
supply the legal training, or of the quality of the training which it does supply, but of its
duty when it provides such training to furnish it to the residents of the State upon the
basis of an equality of right. By the operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has
been created for white law students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race.
The white resident is afforded legal education within the State; the negro resident hav-
ing the same qualifications is refused it there and must go outside the State to obtain it.
That is a denial of the equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the
State has set up, and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another State does
not remove the discrimination.
Id. at 349-50.
89. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
90. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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opportunities available at the University of Texas.9' The University of
Texas was therefore compelled to offer admission to black students.9
2
The McLaurin case stands for the proposition that, once admit-
ted, the black student could not be kept segregated from the rest of the
student body. A black student must be allowed to interact freely with
fellow students in the lively interchange of ideas.9 3 Houston, unfortu-
nately, did not live to see these landmark decisions handed down.94
However, his vision laid the groundwork for these cases and estab-
lished sufficient precedent to bring successfully Brown v. Board of
Education."
We must consider the struggle for equality in educational oppor-
tunities as a demand for inclusion in the larger American society. Cer-
tainly this demand entails the notion that the pursuit of education is
more than a personal endeavor. New knowledge learned in late-night
hours of study must be tested and refined in the bright light of day. It
is only in the intellectual interchange with like-minded souls that true
knowledge becomes rooted in, and made real to, the individual
learner.
9 6
91. The Court found:
[W]e cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and
negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses
and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availa-
bility of law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is supe-
rior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputa-
tion of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the
alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that
one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question close.
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34.
92. Id. at 633-34.
93. McLaurin, in pursuing a doctorate in education, was originally denied admission to the
University of Oklahoma. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638. He successfully sought injunctive relief
based on the Gaines cases and was admitted to the University of Oklahoma after the Oklahoma
legislature amended its segregation statute. Id. at 638-40. However, the amended statute re-
quired him to receive his education segregated from the general student population. He was
eventually "assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified for colored student; he [was]
assigned to a table in the library on the main floor; and he [was] permitted to eat at the same time
in the cafeteria as other students, although here again he was assigned to a special table." Id. at
640.
94. Houston died April 22, 1950. Sweatt and McLaurin were decided on June 5, 1950.
95. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., .347 U.S. 483 (1954).
96. The Supreme Court in McLaurin saw the wisdom of requiring the University of
Oklahoma to remove the barriers to Mr. McLaurin's full pursuit of knowledge:
The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruc-
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Moreover, it is only when an individual can drink from the foun-
tain of learning as deeply as his or her abilities and determination per-
mit, that that individual can partake of the full blessings of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. Education, whether academic or techni-
cal, liberal arts or industrial arts, the tomes of ancient literature or of
basic literacy, is the key to all that our society has to offer.97 To fail in
the fight for equality of education, would be to make the veil of which
DuBois spoke a permanent wall with only small peepholes through
which a significant part of society could glimpse, but never embrace,
the richness and abundance that is America. The larger, societal im-
plications of this travesty were recognized by Houston:
Discrimination in education is symbolic of all the more drastic dis-
criminations which Negroes suffer in American life. And these ap-
parent senseless discriminations in education against Negroes have
a very definite objective on the part of the ruling whites to curb the
young [Blacks] and prepare them to accept an inferior position in
American life without protest or struggle. In the United States the
Negro is economically exploited, politically ignored and socially
ostr[a]cized. His education reflects his condition; the discrimina-
tions practiced against him are no accident.
98
C. The Right to Secure Employment
As he did in housing and education, Houston fought to secure the
tion. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions
and exchange views with other students, and in general, to learn his profession.
Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders increases
correspondingly. Appellant's case represents, perhaps, the epitome of that need, for he
is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in education, to become, by definition, a
leader and trainer of others. Those who will come under his guidance and influence
must be directly affected by the education he receives. Their own education and devel-
opment will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal to that of his
classmates. State-imposed restrictions which product such inequalities cannot be
sustained.
McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
97. McNeil notes that as Special Counsel to the NAACP, Houston was dedicated to the
elimination of discrimination in transportation and education, but perceived discrimination in
education to be more critical. She states, quoting Houston:
Although he had observed the evils resulting from discrimination in transportation and
did not wish to minimize them, Houston had also seen the pressure of an economic
depression lead to the sacrifice of black education in order to preserve white education.
Houston insisted that black people could not let this continue. Since education is a
preparation for the competition of life, he noted, 'a poor education handicaps black
youth who with all elements of American people are in economic competition.'
G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 132 (quoting Houston).
98. Id. at 134.
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pure legal existence of black workers and their inclusion into the
larger realms of the economic marketplace. Although he was not an
expert on labor law, Houston accepted the challenge to fight against
racism in the workforce.99 He focused particularly on employment in
the railroad industry.t °°
His primary efforts in ending employment discrimination cen-
tered on assisting the Association of Colored Railway Trainmen and
Locomotive Firemen in their efforts at organization and in their strug-
gle to keep the white unions from bargaining away black jobs.'' He
also assisted the efforts of others, such as A. Philip Randolph and the
Sleeping Car Porters Union, to protect the rights of black railroad
workers. °2 Houston also worked with and served on the President's
Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) as an assistant special
counsel and he also served as a member of the FEPC.'t 3
The first step in the Houston strategy in the fight for the rights of
99. Id. at 156.
100. See generally id. at 156-75.
101. McNeil describes the obstacles the railroad workers were up against:
The railroad labor world, which included black workers, had boasted racist practices
and policies since the nineteenth century. Four brotherhoods had always restricted
their memberships to whites-the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Order of
Railway Conductors, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, and the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen founded in 1863, 1868, 1873, and 1883 respec-
tively-dominated railroad labor. Unable to bar blacks entirely from the crafts, how-
ever, they traditionally wielded their power-substantiated by their numbers-to
eliminate blacks from the operating department of the industry and to better the work-
ing conditions, wages, and positions of their members.
Id. at 158. For a discussion of the history of the struggle for black employment rights in the
railroad industry, see generally Houston, Foul Employment Practice on the Rails, Crisis, October,
1949, at 269 [hereinafter Houston, Foul Employment Practice].
102. G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at 162-63.
103. Id. at 165-67. McNeil describes the functions of the President's Fair Employment Prac-
tices Committee as follows:
The committee handled complaints of three classifications from across the nation:
those against federal government agencies, those against employers and unions with
companies and corporations having federal government contracts, and those against
employers and the union connected with war industries. To do its work, the FEPC
depended not only on the extensive headquarters' staff of lawyers, examiners, field in-
vestigators, and information officers, but also in large measure on the regional offices.
Id. at 166-67. Houston's work for the FEPC often took significant amounts of time and required
extensive travel across the country to hear employment discrimination complaints. Id. at 171.
In 1945 Houston was instrumental in challenging Washington, D.C.'s Capital Transit Company
which refused to hire and promote "to positions as bus operators, checkers, motormen, or street-
car conductors .. " Id. at 172. After extensive hearings the FEPC issued a directive to Capital
Transit ordering it to end its racially discriminatory employment practices. Id. President Harry
Truman countermanded the FEPC's directive on the grounds that such action was beyond the
scope of the FEPC's authority. Id. at 174. Houston resigned from the FEPC in protest. Id. at
173-75.
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railroad workers was to use the federal Railroad Labor Act as the
basis for asserting that any representative bargaining agent of a work
unit, who was authorized to collectively bargain for all members of
that work unit, must fairly and nondiscriminatorily represent all em-
ployees in that work unit."° This effort asserted the individual rights
of Blacks already employed.
Houston next attacked employment practices which impeded the
initial hiring of black workers. °5 His efforts bore fruit in the
landmark decisions in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. 106
and in its companion case, decided the same day, Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen. °7 In both cases, black
locomotive firemen challenged the efficacy of the all-white Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen to bargain away black
firemen's jobs.'018 At issue was
whether the Railway Labor Act [citations omitted] imposes on a
labor organization, acting by authority of the statute as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of a craft or class of railway employ-
ees, the duty to represent all the employees in the craft without
discrimination because of their race, and, if so, whether the courts
have jurisdiction to protect the minority of the craft or class from
the violation of such obligation.' 9
In examining the purpose of the Railway Labor Act, the Court
determined that in representing a craft of employees, the Brotherhood,
like any other union, must "represent all of its members, regardless of
104. Id. at 1.70-71.
105. Id.
106. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
107. Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). The Tun-
stall case was brought originally in the federal district court, while the Steele case was initiated in
the state courts of Alabama.
108. 'See Steele, 323 U.S. at 192. The Supreme Court noted the invidiousness of the
discrimination:
On March 28, 1940, the Brotherhood, purporting to act as representative of the entire
craft of firemen or giving them the opportunity to be heard, served notice on respon-
dent Railroad and on twenty other railroads operating principally in the southeastern
part of the United States. The notice announced the Brotherhood's desire to amend the
existing collective bargaining agreement in such a manner as ultimately to exclude all
Negro firemen from the service. By established practice on the several railroads so
notified only white firemen can be promoted to serve as engineers, and the notice pro-
posed that only promotable, i.e., white, men should be employed as firemen or assigned
to new runs or jobs or permanent vacancies in established runs or jobs.
Id. at 195. In pursuit of this policy black firemen were reassigned to less remunerative and more
dangerous jobs and white firemen with less seniority replaced them. Id. at 195.
109. Id. at 192.
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their union affiliations or want of them."'1 ° The Brotherhood was, by
statute, empowered to act for all firemen and subsequently had the
power to determine the employment rights of the represented craft."'
Correspondingly, the Brotherhood had "the duty to exercise fairly the
power conferred upon it on behalf of all those for whom it acts, with-
out hostile discrimination against them."' 1 2 This duty placed on the
Brotherhood, as the representative agent established for the Black fire-
men, a federal right to be fairly represented and saw that right as one
that could be enforced in a court of law."
3
The Court grounded its decision on a strict, statutory interpreta-
tion of federal law and recognized a protectable federal right available
to all railway workers represented by a union, regardless of the work-
ers' race, color or creed. Justice Murphy recognized the broader sig-
nificance of the issue presented to the Court. In a concurring opinion
he vigorously stated:
The utter disregard for the dignity and the well-being of colored
citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the
invocation of constitutional condemnation. To decide the case and
to analyze the statute solely upon the basis of legal niceties, while
remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and oppressive depri-
vation of constitutional guarantees, is to make the judicial function
something less than it should be."14
Justice Murphy went on to acknowledge that, more fundamen-
tally, the Railway Labor Act permitted the authorization of a bargain-
ing representative which by its charter and by-laws specifically
110. Id. at 200.
111. Id. at 202-03.
112. Id. at 203. The Court was very specific in defining the nature of the duty to represent all
members of the craft fairly:
So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representative of a craft, it
cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the power of repre-
sentation conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft. While the
statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to determine
eligibility to its membership, it does require the union, in collective bargaining and in
making contracts with the carrier, to represent nonunion or minority union members of
the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. Wher-
ever necessary to that end, the union is required to consider requests of nonunion mem-
bers of the craft and expressions of their views with respect to collective bargaining
with the employer and to give them notice of and opportunity for hearing upon its
proposed action.
Id. at 204.
113. See id. at 204-07; see also Tunstall, 323 U.S. at 210.
114. Steele, 323 U.S. at 208.
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excluded black firemen from membership." 5  For Justice Murphy,
this exclusion cut to the heart of constitutional jurisprudence and the
duty of the Supreme Court. He proclaimed, "[a] sound democracy
cannot allow such discrimination to go unchallenged. Racism is far
too virulent today to permit the slightest refusal, in the light of a Con-
stitution that abhors it, to expose and condemn it wherever it appears
in the course of a statutory interpretation."
'"1 6
The issue was not just a matter of judicial determination of a fed-
erally created right. The issue was the nature and quality of our con-
stitutional democracy as reflected in the heart of our workforce. Who
was to be included and guaranteed protection in our democratic soci-
ety where the right to earn a livelihood is essential to freedom? Hous-
ton fully understood this aspect of the struggle. He insisted that
securing employment rights for railway workers was "basic to the
whole concept of economic democracy. ' ' t 7 There could be no justifi-
cation for the major Brotherhoods' exclusion of black and other
Americans based on their national origin, culture or religion. All
Americans patronized the railways and paid taxes to support them.' 18
Furthermore, the federal government, as the duly constituted rep-
resentative of all the people, should not countenance the exclusion of
115. Justice Murphy concluded:
The cloak of racism surrounding the actions of the Brotherhood in refusing member-
ship to Negroes and in entering into and enforcing agreements discriminating against
them, all under the guise of Congressional authority, still remains. No statutory inter-
pretation can erase this ugly example of economic cruelty against colored citizens of the
United States. Nothing can destroy the fact that the accident of birth has been used as
the basis to abuse the individual rights by an organization purporting to act in conform-
ity with its Congressional mandate. Any attempt to interpret the Act must take that
fact into account and must realize that the constitutionality of the statute in this respect
depends upon the answer given.
Id. at 209.
116. Id.
117. See Houston, supra note 101, at 285. Houston recognized the same issues in other
struggles for labor rights:
Every principle which they establish for railroads can be applied to every other public
utility: gas, electricity, telephone and telegraph, bus lines and air lines, every industry
affected with a public interest. As the Negro Railway labor Executives Association
announced: 'Other fathers and grandfathers pioneered the railway industry, and we
intend to hold this employment and broaden its base until every vestige of segregation
and discrimination, and every limitation on a man's right to hold a job on the railroad
based on race, creed, color, or national origin, is wiped out. When we do this we shall
have gained a victory for the white railroad workers by freeing them from their preju-
dice and their fears; because they are imprisoned just as much as we are.'
Id.
118. Id. at 270. Houston observed that the "Big-four Brotherhoods have the railroad train
and engine service tied up tight for a white monopoly, for a 'Nordic closed shop.' " Id.
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some Americans from America's bounty because of their race, color or
creed. The government's complicity in the subjugation of black work-
ers was demonstrated by Houston and John P. Davis in their study of
the Tennessee Valley Authority and other New Deal programs created
to put Americans back to work during the Great Depression." 9 The
New Deal was about social and economic recovery, and Houston and
Davis stated what ought to be obvious if a return to prosperity was the
goal:
[Flundamentally no recovery program in the South can succeed
without admitting the Negro to his full and equal share. If it is a
question of increasing buying power, the South cannot raise itself
very high as long as it keeps twenty-five per cent of its population
on starvation wages. If it is a question of social rehabilitation and
the standards of living, the South cannot be secure as long as one-
fourth of its population is held in ignorance, squalor and disease.
The South cannot keep its prejudice and have its prosperity too.
120
The message is clear: unless all are included in plans and pro-
grams for the economic advancement of the nation, none will be able
to prosper fully due to the social and economic drain caused by those
who are purposely excluded.
V. HOUSTONIAN SCHOLARSHIP: A PROPOSED AGENDA
Through our scholarship we have before us the high opportunity
to advance creatively the pursuit of social justice as envisioned by our
foreparents. 2 1 Consider how powerful a framework of scholarship
119. See Houston and Davis, TVA: Lily- White Reconstruction, The Crisis, October 1934, at
290. This article documents the federal government's efforts to develop hydro-electric power
along the Tennessee River. The authors highlight how blacks were at best tolerated in this multi-
million dollar project and at worst completely excluded from its benefits. The authors, in consid-
ering the need for organized struggle against governmental discrimination, concluded:
For if the Negro population is to benefit by the cheap electricity produced and distrib-
uted by the T.V.A., it means that the fight must go on to increase its purchasing power.
The fight must go on to get the Negro industrial worker increased recognition and
income under the NRA [National Recovery Administration], and the Negro sharecrop-
per and farmer a larger share of his produce under the AAA [Agricultural Adjustment
Administration]. The stark truth is that the entire 'New Deal' administration must be
made to realize that the economic wage slavery and social suppression cursing the
South today, are absolutely incompatible with a real return to prosperity.
Id. at 311.
120. Id.
121. In his memoriam to Professor Frank D. Reeves, Dean Smith challenged us to follow the
lead of the great law teachers who worked for social justice:
Professor Reeves, like Houston, as a law teacher and litigator, frequently emphasized to
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grounded upon the Houstonian principles of pure legal existence cou-
pled with thoughtfully conceived plans of action.
Our task now is to propose a research agenda for the scholar-
activist in the Houstonian mold. 12 2 Rather than attempting to be de-
finitive, this is "an effort to think about what we should be thinking
about," as Professor Deborah Rhode suggests in her reflections on a
research agenda for gender and jurisprudence.' 23 Utilizing the pri-
mary issues with which Houston wrestled as a preliminary guide, we
can now propose agenda items in housing, education and employment.
A. An Agenda for Housing
From the shoulders of Houston we stand firmly on the precedents
of Shelley v. Kramer 24 and Hurd v. Hodge. 125 We are buttressed by
the Fair Housing Act of 1968126 and the decisions of Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 1 27  Trafficante v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,128 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp. 129 Yet, as recent as January 1988, the Housing Sub-
committee of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Committee
considered extensive testimony on discrimination and segregation pat-
terns in residential housing. 13
0
students the need for civil rights litigators and for civil rights planners and scholars, to
mutually assist each other in order to present and to channel the message to both the
national and local governments, that the bell tolled for the application of the principles
of formal justice for black citizens in America.
Professor Reeves shared with his students, and with the collective bar, a simple philoso-
phy, that the law is the appropriate means to gain access to benchmarks beyond the
barriers of racism and that the Howard University School of Law should continue to
serve as the clearing house for legal planning of issues involving the to rights of blacks
and other minorities in this country. There is encouraging evidence that legal scholars
are about the work long awaited by law teachers, such as Professor Reeves, that is, an
analytical expression of the state of the law and the state of blacks under the law.
Smith, supra note 12.
122. See Brooks, supra note 11.
123. Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence. An Agenda for Research, 56 CINCINNATI L. REV.
521 (1987).
124. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
125. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1947).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968).
127. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1967).
128. Trafficante v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
129. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
130. In January, 1988, the Housing Subcommittee of the House of Representatives' Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs Committee held a hearing to study the enforcement of fair housing
laws. See also Marino, Blacks still Encounter Segregation: Professor Says Economic Status
Doesn't Explain Housing Patterns, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1988, at Fl. The House Subcommittee
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The accelerating cost of housing in most areas compounds the
problem. A recent report by the Louis & Nettleton Company in its
newsletter, U.S. Housing Market, noted that the cost of housing con-
tinues to skyrocket and monthly mortgage payments gobble up in-
creasingly larger percentages of take-home pay.1 3' Affordable, decent
housing is becoming more difficult to obtain, especially for minorities
and women whose income continues to lag behind the national aver-
age of white males.' 32 Further exacerbating the income gap problem
is the unconscionably higher unemployment rates for minorities.
3
Housing that might be available and affordable is increasingly be-
ing lost to "gentrification," a phenomenon by which upwardly mobile,
middle-class individuals or real estate agents purchase housing in de-
pressed, run-down or low-income neighborhoods with the intent of to-
tally remodelling the premises. t 31 The gentrification process has
occurred in many central cities, often spurred on by the banking and
real estate industries. 135  While this process may revitalize inner-city
considered a report by Professor Douglas S. Massey, Director of the University of Chicago's
Population Research Center. 'Id. Professor Massey concluded that "white Americans' prejudice
against blacks 'is at the root' of continued housing segregation." Id.
131. Foote, Jr., House Payments Rise Above $1,000: Average Monthly Mortgage Bill Jumps 8
Percent, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1988, at El, col. 2.
132. In 1986, 31.1 percent of blacks and 27.3 [percent] of Hispanics had incomes below
the poverty level-nearly three times the rate for whites. [Statistical Abstract of the
U.S. 1988, Table 715, p. 435.] Median black family income was only 57 percent that of
whites, $17,604 as opposed to $30,809. Median Hispanic family income was $19,995.
[Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1988, Table 700, p. 427.]
One Third of a Nation, A Report by the Commission on Minority Participation in Education
and American Life 4 (1988).
133. Black unemployment reached record levels for the post WW II period during the
recent recession. Thus, this latest recession continues the trend of each recession hav-
ing a more devastating effect on the black population. Moreover, black unemployment
rates were already high at the onset of the recession at 12.3% in 1979. The recession
pushed the average black unemployment to 19.5% in 1983 even though the recovery
phase had already begun. Since 1975, the annual average black unemployment rate has
been 15.2%. There has been no year during this period in which black unemployment
was less than 12%. Since 1981 the black unemployment rates have averaged 17% and
there hasn't been a single year in the last five when black unemployment was less than
15%. Even for the first three quarters of 1985, the third year of the recovery, black
unemployment averaged 15.1%.
National Urban League, State of Black America 14 (1987).
134. See generally Lawrence, Gentrification, Is It a New Form of Oppression on a New Oppor-
tunity, The Crisis, Nov., 1985, at 426.
135. Redlining consists of the denial of home loans for or insurance coverage on dwellings
based on the characteristics of the neighborhood surrounding the dwelling. Lending institutions
or insurance underwriters draw a "red line" on a map around certain neighborhoods and refuse
to consider applications for loans or insurance for dwellings within the "red line." Redlining has
been held to be a discriminatory violation of 804 and 805 of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C.
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neighborhoods, increased housing prices (which are driven up through
demand for housing in now fashionable neighborhoods) and higher
real estate taxes displace residents in these and surrounding
neighborhoods. 136
Where will people go to find safe, decent and affordable housing
within a reasonable distance from their place of employment without
confronting discriminatory barriers? When persons are excluded from
the community because they cannot find housing, how and where can
they exercise the rights which define their pure legal existence? Will
more people experience the wretched plight of the homeless and be
further excluded from our democratic republic?
Our task is to design an agenda for action to improve and increase
housing opportunities for those who are being edged towards the
fringes of our society. We know much about housing discrimination,
unaffordability and unavailability; but more data and analyses are
needed to understand the relationship between the complex factors
that keep a significant segment of our citizenry in poor housing or in
no housing at all. Only then will we be able to craft creative methods
of utilizing the legal system to promote the pure legal existence of all
Americans.
Many housing issues and problems cry for the attention of our
best minds. First, the implication of Professor Massey's research on
housing discrimination is that the current laws and constitutional
guarantees on fair housing are not being vigorously enforced and/or
need to be strengthened.' 37 Why is that the case? Has the Reagan
Administration forsaken the constitutional rights of the poor in this
area? What is the litigation trend in pursuing federal fair housing
cases? Are the courts reading fair housing laws more restrictively and
conservatively? Are discriminatory practices like steering and
blockbusting by realtors continuing unabated? Is the banking industry
developing more sophisticated methods of red-lining and disinvest-
ment in minority communities? Do local zoning laws affect housing
3604, 3605). Springfield v. McCarren, 549 F. Supp. 1134 (1982). See Comment, Legislating
Against Mortgage Redlining: The Need for a Firmer Commitment, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 151 (1980);
Duncan, Hood & Nect, Redlining Practices, Racial Desegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighbor-
hood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URB. LAW. 510 (1975).
136. See Lawrence, supra note 133.
137. See supra note 129.
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availability?13  Certainly there are many other causes of housing dis-
crimination, unavailability and unaffordability that can be explored by
our best minds.
Second, closely connected to the use of courts in pursuing hous-
ing rights is the exercise of political participation in the governing pro-
cess. We all have the privilege of voting, running for office, and
expecting accountability from public officials charged with the care of
the community. We must "mobilize the masses" and be vigilant in
seeing that all housing laws are vigorously enforced. We must devote
attention to those exercises of governmental power which destroy
housing stock or foster gentrification. Such exercises of power are of
special concern when governing bodies pursue economic development
without first considering the needs of all citizens. Law professors can
provide guidance to the mobilization of the masses by providing vigor-
ous public policy analysis.
Third, we should pursue creative ways to promote home owner-
ship. Lending institutions should be challenged under the Community
Reinvestment Act to invest in local minority and low-income commu-
nities. 39 Existing local housing authorities must be reviewed to en-
sure that all available state and federal mortgage and rental assistance
programs are fully utilized. If localities do not have a housing author-
ity, we should vigorously prompt them to establish an agency through
which home ownership can become a reality. Similarly, law professors
can construct appropriate organization models of non-profit organiza-
tions which can assist in providing low and moderate-income hous-
ing. " Further, in some areas, urban homesteading has proven to be a
successful mechanism for encouraging home ownership.' 4 ' How can
138. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
139. See Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. 2901-2905 (-) (Title V11 of the
Housing and Community Development Act). See Head, Representation of Clients under the
Community Reinvestment Act, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1004 (1988).
140. See, Yale Law Students Aid the Homeless by Preserving Low Income Housing, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 1, 1988, at 38.
141. 12 U.S.C. 1706e( ) allows the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to:
transfer without payment to a unit of general local government or a State, or a qualified
community organization or public agency designated by a unit of general local govern-
ment or a State, any real property-
(1) which is improved by a one-to-four family residence;
(2) to which the Secretary holds title;
(3) which is not occupied by a person legally entitled to reside there;
(4) which is requested by such unit, [s]tate, or agency for use in an urban homestead
program; and
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laws be revised to aid in these endeavors? What tax laws support crea-
tive approaches to low-income housing production? Law reform
scholarship in the tax area is extremely important.'42
Related issues demand even further study. What impact does
public transportation, or the lack of it, have on housing availability?
Should states require, as New Jersey does, that each municipal sub-
division commit to providing a certain percentage of low and moder-
ate-income housing?' 43 Finally, what would be learned by studying
(5) which the Secretary determines is suitable for use in an urban homestead program
which meets the requirements of subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
The individual or family to whom the property is conveyed must agree to:
(A) occupy such property as a principal residence for a period of not less than 5 years,
except under such emergency standards as may be prescribed by the Secretary;
(B) repair all defects in the property that pose a substantial danger to health and
safety within 1 year of the date of conveyance; and
(C) make such repairs and improvements to the property as may be necessary to meet
applicable local standards for decent, safe, and sanitary housing within 3 years
after the date of initial conveyance, and
(D) Permit reasonable periodic inspections at reasonable times by employees of the
unit of general local government or State or the qualified community organiza-
tion or public agency designated by the unit of general local government or [s]tate
for the purpose of determining compliance with the agreement.
Id.
Upon compliance with the above requirements the homesteader is granted fee simple title to
the property without consideration. Furthermore 42 U.S.C. 1452b(-) provides for the granting
of low interest loans for the rehabilitation of these urban homestead properties.
142. See 6 U.S.C. 42 (1986) (Low-income housing credit) and 26 U.S.C. 142(d) (1986) (Ex-
empt facility bonds for qualified residential rental projects). For a general explanation of these
provisions see Prentice Hall Federal Taxes, Bulletin 20 Extra (May 11, 1987), Joint Committee
on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, "Blue Book," prepared by the
Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
143. In 1975 the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the question:
[W]hether a developing municipality, by a system of land use regulation, make it physi-
cally and economically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the
municipality for the various categories of persons who need and want it and thereby, as
Mount Laurel has, exclude such people from living within its confines because of the
limited extent of their income and resources.
So. Burlington City NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (1975)
(This case is known as Mt. Laurel I). Plaintiffs brought the suit on behalf of the poor minorities,
although the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the issue in the larger context of all low and
moderate income persons who could not afford housing in suburban townships like Mt. Laurel.
Id. at 717. The Court held:
that every such municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make
realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically,
presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for
low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that
opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and
prospective regional need therefore.
Id. at 724.
The New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the same issue with the same parties in So. Bur-
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the correlation between income levels, discrimination in employment,
discrimination in housing, access to quality education based on resi-
dence, and other social issues which may retard the pursuit of a digni-
fied existence? Rigorous scholarship devoted to the multi-dimensional
aspects of these issues can reveal the true nature of the housing prob-
lem and yield possible solutions.
B. An Agenda for Education
From the shoulders of Houston we stand firmly on the precedents
of Pearson v. Murray,1" Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,"4 5 Sweatt v.
painter,'46 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,147 and Brown v.
lington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Township, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (This case is
known as Mt. laurel II). After ten years Mount Laurel Township continued to have exclusion-
ary zoning and had made no progress in making low and moderate income housing available. Id.
at 410. After vigorously reaffirming the doctrine announced in Mt. Laurel I, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held:
We have reexamined the Mount Laurel doctrine and have found it correct. We have
reaffirmed the judiciary's commitment to the enforcement of the constitutional right
and its resulting remedy. We have found it necessary to rectify the ineffective adminis-
tration of this doctrine in our courts. We have simplified the scope of litigation; the
Mount Laurel obligation is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litigation.
We have substituted as a remedy the plans for growth in the State Development Guide
Plan for the concept of developing municipalities directed lower courts to dispose of the
Mount Laurel litigation on a one-stop basis, and provided for the assignment of three
judges to manage the cases statewide on a uniform basis. We have required municipali-
ties to take affirmative action to comply with Mount Laurel and refocused the litigation
on the question of whether low and moderate income housing will be built.
As we said at the outset, while we have always preferred legislative to judicial action in
this field, we shall continue-until the legislature acts to do our best to uphold the
constitutional obligation that underlies the Mount Laurel doctrine. That is our duty.
We may not build hoses, but we do enforce the Constitution.
The provision of decent housing for the poor is not a function of this court. Our only
role is to see to it that zoning does not prevent it, but rather provides a realistic oppor-
tunity for its construction as required by New Jersey's Constitution. The actual con-
struction of that housing will continue to depend, in a much larger degree, on the
economy, on private enterprise, and on the actions of the other branches of government
at the national, state and local level. We intend here only to make sure that if the poor
remain locked into urban slums, it will not be because we failed to enforce the
Constitution.
Id. at 490.
Subsequently, the New Jersey State Legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act. N.J. STAT.
ANN. 52:270-302-344 (1986). The Act codified the judicial doctrine announced in Mt. Laurel I
and II. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:270-302, 303. The Fair Housing Act authorizes an administra-
tive planning mechanism by which low and moderate income housing can be provided in munici-
palities. For a discussion of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, see Comment, The Fair Housing
Act: Meeting the Mt. Laurel Obligation with a Statewide Plan, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 585
(1986).
144. Pearson v. Murry, -, 192 A. 590 (1936); see also G. MCNEIL, supra note 14, at -.
145. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
146. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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Board of Education.4 The Constitution guarantees that all of
America's children will have an equal opportunity to obtain a quality
education. Local school systems may no longer purposely segregate
students according to race. Yet, one hauntingly wonders what educa-
tion integration has wrought.
Has the promise of Brown been wholly achieved throughout this
democratic land? Where de jure discrimination has been judicially ex-
cised, has the promise of an improved educational experience been ful-
filled? Is there a correlation between the increasing drop-out rate for
black students and the decreasing enrollment in post-secondary
schools? Recent cases suggest that present day de facto segregation
(caused in large part by housing segregation) may not be amenable to
legislative or judicial correction. 49 If so, will further desegregation
litigation be fruitless?
As stated earlier, education is the key that unlocks limitless op-
portunities to maximize the potential of each individual.' Only with
education will individual citizens, regardless of race, religion, gender
or ethnicity, be productive, contributing participants in this great so-
cial experiment we call America. Our task is to design an agenda for
action which focuses on the clarion call of Mary Hatwood Futrell,
President of the National Education Association, to "unleash the full
potential of every student."' 5 '
First, it is imperative that the present state of education equality
law be fully assessed. What is the present state of the law under the
fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act? On what basis and
with what level of proof can a successful desegregation suit be
brought? Under what circumstances will school systems under school
desegregation orders be released from further federal judicial supervi-
147. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
148. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
149. For a discussion of recent cases considering the impact of discriminatory housing pat-
terns on school segregation see Hankins, The Constitutional Implications of Residential Segrega-
tion and School Segregation-To Boldly Go Where Few Courts Have Gone, 30 How. L.J. 481
(1987), and Rudley, School Desegregation: Whose Responsibility?, 12 THURGOOD MARSHALL
L.J. 109 (1986).
150. See discussion supra accompanying notes 95-96.
151. Futrell, The Alternative to Tracking (National Education Association advertisement),
Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1988, at C3.
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sion?' 5 2 How can we better monitor school systems to ensure compli-
ance with requisite constitutional standards on equality of educational
opportunity?
Clearly, understanding where we are and how we arrived here is
essential to planning where it is that we must direct our efforts. For
civil rights organizations, this assessment is crucial in planning future
activities and allocating limited resources. For the legal educator
planning improved civil rights law curricula, this assessment is of par-
ticular importance. Some law students under our instruction will rep-
resent parties in educational civil rights suits or serve as legal advisors
to school systems which seek to comply with civil rights laws or judi-
cial decrees.
Second, in reviewing the impact of school integration, it is imper-
ative that we consider the status of minority teachers. Longitudinal
studies have demonstrated that after integration, the number of black
teachers in previously segregated school systems has drastically de-
clined. 53 Given the recent lack of enthusiasm for affirmative action,
we must assess this decline. Is there discrimination in the hiring pro-
cess? Are fewer minorities entering the teaching field? How many
minorities hold administrative positions and participate in promulgat-
ing hiring policies? What relationship, if any, does the racial composi-
tion of the school board have to the percentage of minority teachers
employed? Should we judicially challenge school systems that lack
ethnic and racial diversity from the school board to the maintenance
staff?
Another facet of this problem is the trend toward recertification
of teachers. Professor Beverly Charles, in her recent work, suggests
that competency testing in Texas has had a negative impact on minor-
ity teachers. 154 Are there other official or unofficial methods of testing
teacher competency that work to the detriment of minority teachers?
What evaluative techniques are utilized in making retention, promo-
tion and salary increase decisions? Does a lack of commitment to staff
152. See Riddick by Riddick v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1180 (1986).
153. Smith and Smith, For Black Educators: Integration Brings the Axe.
154. Charles, First They Come for the Teachers...: Competency Testing and the Decertifica-
tion of Texas Teachers Issued Certificates Valid for Life, 12 THURGOOD MARSHALL L.J. 1
(1986). But see Rebell, Disparate Impact of Teacher Competency Testing on Minorities: Don't
Blame the Test Takers or the Tests, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 375 (1986).
[Vol. 32
VISION FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE
and administrative diversity translate into lower merit evaluation for
minority teachers? These issues cut to the heart of maintaining minor-
ity teachers' pure legal existence and their inclusion in the great task of
providing quality education for all children.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must consider the im-
pact integration has had on minority children. How has the quality of
the educational experience improved for minority students? An an-
swer to this question certainly requires an evaluation of current empir-
ical data and may require the development of innovative measuring
instruments. We do know that integration has caused white flight to
the suburbs and tend to private schools, draining resources away from
public schools. The broader implication of this loss of revenue may
well require a review of state and local education spending patterns.
Are there disparities in resource allocations between school districts
and do these disparities correlate to racial profiles? Have so-called
"magnet schools" improved educational opportunities or merely al-
lowed marginal schools with meager resources and poor programing
to exist?'55 Some of these problems may require legislative or political
solutions.
More troublesome still is the problem of evaluating how individ-
ual students are being treated in the classroom. Recent studies suggest
that most schools utilize a class placement method called "tracking,"
where students are grouped according to perceived ability levels as re-
flected by standardized achievement tests."' Tracking and the testing
methods employed have a disproportionately negative impact on mi-
nority children. A significant portion of these children are assigned to
the lowest achievement group or categorized as possessing learning
disabilities. Teachers have minimal expectations for these children
and resources for helping these children fulfill their potential are dis-
proportionately fewer. These children tend to feel excluded from the
general student population and to show a lower self-esteem.
Since there is a right to equal opportunity for quality education,
we should study ways to ensure the attainment of that right.' 57 This
155. See Price and Stern, Magnet Schools as a Strategy for Integration and School Reform 5
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 291 (1977). But see Metz, In Education, Magnets Attract Controversy, 6
NEA TODAY 54 (Jan. 1988).
156. See Oakes, Tracking: Can Schools Take a Different Route?, 6 NEA TODAY 41 (Jan.
1988).
157. For a provocative discussion on how to achieve quality education for minority children
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study will necessitate not only scholarly analysis of educational dis-
crimination on the macro-level of the school system, but also on the
micro-level of the individual student whose pure legal existence must
be preserved and who must have the opportunity to participate effec-
tively and to maximize his or her potential in the larger community.
C. An Agenda for Employment
From the shoulders of Houston, we have Steele'5 8 and Tun-
stall 159 which establish the equal right to participate in employment
opportunities. Building upon these precedents, we know that employ-
ers and unions must not exclude on the basis of race, sex, religion or
disability. To the contrary, each has an affirmative duty to include
workers who historically have been denied access to employment
opportunities. "
Despite these gains, Blacks still lag woefully behind in employ-
ment opportunities.' 6' The unemployment rate is still significantly
higher among Blacks than whites, and is especially higher among
black youth. 62 Employment opportunities as reflected by wages con-
tinue to demonstrate that Blacks with qualifications similar to those of
whites receive significantly lower annual earnings.' 63  While entry-
see Bell, Jr., The Legacy of WE. B. DuBois: A Rational Model for Achieving Public Schools
Equity for America's Black Children, II CREIGHTON L. REV. 409 (1977). See also V. Wilson-
Wesley, Making America's Classrooms Work, BLACK ENTERPRISE Sept. 1984, at 34.
158. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
159. Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
160. See generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, California, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 94 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1987);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
For an excellent discussion of affirmative action in employment see Edwards, The Future of
Affirmative Action in Employment, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763 (1987).
161. See Edwards, supra note 159, at 767.
162. The unemployment rate for whites averaged only 6.7% over the last 11 years ver-
sus the 15.2% rate for blacks. In the last five years when black unemployment aver-
aged 17%, white unemployment averaged 7.3%. The increase in disparities affected all
demographic groups. Over the last five years adult black male unemployment rates
averaged 8.9 percentage points more than whites, black women averaged 8.1 percentage
points more unemployment, and black teenager unemployment rates were 26.4 percent-
age points higher than white teenage unemployment rates.
See National Urban League, supra note 132, at 15.
163. Racial inequality persisted throughout the income distribution in 1984. Both the
black poor and the black wealthy have lower incomes than whites at similar positions
in income distribution. However, racial inequality is greatest among the lower income
groups.
- Swinton, Economic Status of Blacks, 1985.
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level and low skilled jobs seem to be available in abundance for minor-
ities, employment positions in middle and upper management and in
the professions continue to be difficult for Blacks to secure in more
than marginal numbers."'I Similarly discouraging figures show that
fewer Blacks own businesses or are self-employed, a factor particularly
noticeable in the attainment of government contracts for goods and
services. 16 5 Underinclusion of black-owned businesses in government
contracts and of black workers in the performance of these contracts
tends to negate the pure legal existence of a large class of Americans.
Accordingly, there is much work to be done in this area. The
minority law professor is well-equipped to provide the systematic anal-
ysis of employment discrimination.' 66 Certainly, the effectiveness of
existing legal protection and the possible erosion of that protection
must be carefully observed and noted. New legal strategies that pre-
serve the ground already attained and that advance the pure legal
existence of historically excluded Americans beyond that ground
should be arduously pursued.
Further, empirical research is needed to determine the very na-
ture of present employment discrimination. When and how are indi-
viduals being discriminated against in the attainment of employment?
Is there "token" hiring of minorities, and if so, how do we push be-
yond the glass barriers which limit employment advances and move to
fuller, more meaningful opportunities? What is the relationship be-
tween inadequate educational opportunities and broad based employ-
ment opportunities? How do advancing technologies and job
obsolescence impact upon minority job opportunities?
164. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census 37% of black families had annual incomes
of under $10,000 in 1983 while only 13% of white families had annual incomes of under $10,000.
In 1983 black families comprised 36% of those with annual incomes between $10,000 and
$24,999 while white families made up 35% of this category. Furthermore, only 14% of black
families had incomes over $25,000 while 64% of white families had an income of over $25,000.
Only 4% of black families were reported as having income over $50,000 while 14% of white
families were reported as having incomes over $50,000. Bureau of the Census, Money Income of
Households, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1983, Consumer Income: Current Pop-
ulation Reports, Series P-60, No. 146 (1985).
165. Only 5. 2% of employed blacks are in executive, administrative or managerial posi-
tions. Only 3.0% are lawyers or judges, 4. 0% are college or university teachers, 3.3% are
physicians or dentists (only 6.7% are engaged in a professional specialty) and 4.0% are supervi-
sors or proprietors of sales outlets. 23.8% of the employed blacks work in cleaning and building
service occupations as maids or janitors. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1988, Table 627 (108th ed. 1988).
166. Judge Edwards' article is an excellent example. See Edwards, supra note 159.
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These and similar questions suggest the need for a more compre-
hensive approach in considering equal employment opportunity. To
secure legal rights buttressed by the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is only the beginning of the establishment of pure legal
existence and inclusion into the richness and abundance that is
America. Minorities cannot obtain this until the concept of justice is
meaningfully enlarged to include an economic component. As Hous-
ton noted, employment rights are "basic to the whole concept of eco-
nomic democracy." 1 67 Employment is but a part of the larger realm of
economic opportunity. The ability to participate fully in the economic
life of the community marks the wholeness of one's pure legal exist-
ence. 16' To be wholly included in the rich economic life of the larger
community is a reaffirmance of how our democratic society values the
worth of individuals. The national Conference of Catholic Bishops, in
their pastoral letter on economic justice, fully understood that justice,
as conceived in American constitutional jurisprudence, included eco-
nomic rights.169 In articulating a Christian vision of economic life, the
Catholic Bishops declared the following:
The basis for all that the church believes about the moral dimen-
sions of economic life is its vision of the transcendent worth-the
sacredness--of human beings. The dignity of the human person,
realized in community with others, is the criterion against which all
aspects of economic life must be measured. All human beings,
therefore, are ends to be served by the institutions that make up the
economy, not means to be exploited for more narrowly defined
goals. Human personhood must be respected with a reverence that
is religious. When we deal with each other, we should do so with
the sense of awe that arises in the presence of something holy and
sacred. For that is what human beings are: we are created in the
image of God (Gn. 1:27). Similarly, all economic institutions must
support the bonds of community and solidarity that are essential to
the dignity of persons. Wherever our economic arrangements fail to
conform to the demands of human dignity lived in community, they
must be questioned and transformed.
170
We, as legal scholars, have the high duty to define more fully and
167. See supra note 117.
168. See supra note 115 (Justice Murphy's comments in text accompanying note).
169. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (1986).
170. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
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advocate for economic justice. We can accomplish this on at least two
levels. First, we must provide empirical research into the problem in
order to articulate a comprehensive definition of economic justice. In
our attempt to understand economic justice we must know the magni-
tude of the problem. This understanding will require a quantitative
analysis of hiring statistics, employment practices and the economic
impact of differing employment patterns. Recently litigated cases
should be examined to evaluate judicial trends in employment discrim-
ination and affirmative action law. 7 ' Of particular importance is that
we must be able to gauge the levels of proof and evidence needed to
bring successfully an employment action.
On a deeper level, we need to know where the successes are.
What actions and programs have been effective in creating employ-
ment opportunity? Can these approaches be duplicated? If not, are
there economic niches that can be exploited by minorities to create
fuller opportunities for economic advancement?
As teachers of future lawyers, we have the opportunity to train
and inspire a cadre of skilled men and women dedicated to actualizing
the dream of economic justice for all. In the great tradition of Charles
Houston we can lay the educational groundwork upon which the fu-
ture can be built. Indeed, the rich reward of our profession is as
Christa McAuliffe, the late Challenger astronaut put it, to "touch the
future" through the students who pass our way. 172
First, we must teach our students the skills of lawyering and en-
sure that the how-to-skills of civil rights litigation and advocacy are
mastered. Equally important, our students must master the rigors of
tax, corporate and commercial law. Additionally, as minorities con-
tinually experience the loss of land and accumulated family resources,
we need to prepare students to be expert financial and estate planners.
To ensure that latent potential is not crushed in the crucible of poverty
related crimes, we also need skilled criminal attorneys who can ensure
justice in criminal courts. In short, the lawyers that we train ought to
be, as Judge Robinson noted, "superlative" in whatever they do.' 7 3
Second, as we design and implement the curricula for our individ-
ual courses, we should endeavor to develop teaching methodologies
171. See Edwards, supra note 160; see also, Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987).
172. See supra note 30.
173. See Robinson, supra note 16.
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and materials that emphasize social justice. We should be able to
demonstrate systematic processes that promote economic development
in minority and disadvantaged communities. For instance, in the area
of corporate law planning for family-owned businesses, we can ex-
amine how capital can be raised without compromising the equity in-
terest of the family. In this regard, an attorney needs to know the
process for obtaining public or private venture capital and how to in-
terface with lending institutions so as to minimize the amount of per-
sonal property that might be collateralized. Our focus must be to
enable our students to understand the unique legal problems facing the
minority business community and how they, as lawyers, can craft ap-
propriate, innovative solutions.
Similarly, constitutional law courses should consider various as-
pects of economic justice. For instance, it is constitutionally permissi-
ble to boycott businesses which have a regressive hiring record for
minorities.'74 The enormous purchasing power of the minority com-
munity cannot be ignored. On another front, the study of the fif-
teenth, nineteenth and twenty-sixth amendments to the United States
Constitution could include an analysis of how the right to vote, which
represents more than simply selecting candidates for office, can be uti-
lized to advance economic justice. Through the vote, we impact polit-
ical process and policy. Our voting strength should guarantee our fair
share of political patronage jobs and opportunities. For lawyers, the
protection of voting strength means gaining access to municipal repre-
sentation and judgeships, to government contract and bond work.
Our approach can take constitutional theory and apply it to the reali-
ties of the political marketplace, demonstrating what is at stake when
we discuss the political franchise.
CONCLUSION
For this Afro-American professor who struggles to make his
existence relevant and meaningful in this strange academic paradise,
the legacy of Charles Hamilton Houston is inspirational, indeed.
From Houston's broad shoulders, which bore the burden of the battle
for dignity and justice, I see the promised land of a just society stretch-
ing our clearly before us. If we hew towards the role of social engineer
174. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1981), reh. denied, 459 U.S. 898
(1982).
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as lived by Houston, all we have to do is inhabit that promised land.
That land, our land has already been paid for.
Our task is two-fold: one, to make the Houstonian vision a real-
ity for all Americans, and, two, to maintain and preserve that just
society for which Houston lived, worked, and died. To accomplish
this task, we scholar/activists must be as passionate and as determined
as Dean Houston was. We must have a passion for justice in the ful-
lest sense. We must have a passion for disciplined study and profes-
sional excellence. We must have a passion for personal integrity and
the highest of ethical standards. We must have a will to sacrifice our
very beings, if necessary, to make the Houstonian vision of pure legal
existence and our inclusion in a just democratic society a living reality.
You must not only be but superior, and just as superior in all re-
spects as time, energy, money and ability permit. I wouldn't be
stymied by difficulties-The most important thing now, as fast as
conditions are changing, is that no Negro tolerate any ceiling on his
ambitions or imagination. Good luck and don't have any doubts;
you haven't time for such foolishness.
1 7 5
175. Robinson, supra note 16, at 5.
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